Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality by Steele, Jr., Walter W.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 39 
Issue 5 Issue 5 - October 1986 Article 4 
10-1986 
Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality 
Walter W. Steele, Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Walter W. Steele, Jr., Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39 Vanderbilt Law Review 1387 
(1986) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol39/iss5/4 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 




Walter W. Steele, Jr.*
"There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry, in which a
high-toned morality is more imperatively necessary than that of the law."'
I. PREVALENT AMBIGUITIES
Rising concern about the adequacy of the adversary system to
deal with disputes quickly, fairly, and economically has led to in-
creased interest in a broad range of alternate dispute resolution
mechanisms such as arbitration and the use of mini-trials. Pres-
ently, however, negotiation between disputants or negotiation be-
tween counsel for disputants is the best understood and most often
utilized alternative to litigation. In fact, negotiating prior to litigat-
ing is so pervasive that it might be thought of as an inherent part
of the litigation process.
From a lawyer's perspective, an advantage of negotiation over
other forms of dispute resolution is that negotiation usually is done
by lawyers. Litigators and negotiators are usually the same law-
yers, and many lawyers negotiate more than they litigate. But con-
sider the following points: (1) lawyers study litigation as an art and
frequently attend courses about litigation; but lawyers seldom
study negotiation as an art, and courses about negotiation are rela-
tively rare; (2) litigators operate under sophisticated rules of proce-
dure that prevent abuse and exploitation of one litigator by an-
other, stronger litigator, but negotiators operate under primitive
and obtuse rules of professional responsibility and under an amor-
phous set of professional mores common among lawyers.
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law. L.L.B. 1957, South-
ern Methodist University; L.L.M. 1969, University of Texas.
1. G. SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS 55 (1896), cited in Rubin, A Cau-
serie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 577, 578-79 (1975).
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How can we account for the incongruity of lawyers calling
themselves litigators when they actually negotiate for the most
part? How can we account for the incongruity of lawyers possess-
ing sophisticated litigation skills learned through concerted effort,
although they spend most of their time negotiationg with little or
no formal training in the art of negotiation? Why was negotiation
left at the starting gate, while litigation charged ahead as the most
visible, if not the most useful, aspect of a lawyer's professional
skill? Surely the skills and art of negotiating are no more difficult
to teach and to learn than are the skills and art of trial advocacy.
We must look for something other than teachability to account for
the fact that litigation skills hold the limelight while negotiation
skills are under-studied.
An answer to our little puzzle may be that explicit negotiation
rules are controversial and value laden, while explicit rules of pro-
cedure for courts are pervasive and normative. Studying a negoti-
ating rule brings forth remarkably varying opinions, but consider-
ing a rule of procedure for courts evokes little controversy. The
adversary system unifies thinking about rules of procedure for
courts, but no well-understood, commonly accepted unifying phi-
losophy for negotiating exists. This lack of an underlying premise
about negotiation may account in part for the fact that standards
for negotiation are called "ethics," while standards for procedure
in court are called "rules." Certainly, the lack of an underlying
premise about negotiation accounts for the infrequent formal study
of negotiation.
Much of the ambiguity surrounding standards of negotiation
centers around trustworthiness. Unfortunately, trustworthiness
and its outward manifestation - truth telling - are not absolute
values. For example, no one tells the truth all of the time, nor is
perpetual truth telling expected in most circumstances. To tell the
truth in some social situations would be a rude convention. Conse-
quently, when one speaks of the essential nature of trustworthiness
and truth telling, one actually is talking about a certain circum-
stance or situation in which convention calls for trustworthiness or
truth telling. Thus, a person considered trustworthy and a truth
teller actually is a person who tells the truth at the right or neces-
sary time. That person is adept at determining when the proper
time for truth has come and perhaps even signals to the opposite
party that now that person may be reliable.2 Reliance is a signifi-
2. This concept of situational truth telling is taken from Hazard, The Lawyer's Obli-
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cant factor in trustworthiness. For example, in the typical sale of
real estate a title search is routine without regard to how trustwor-
thy the seller may be. No one relies on the seller's word. In that
situation and in many others no significance whatsoever is at-
tached to the value of the seller's trustworthiness. On the other
hand, the virtue of trustworthiness can be quite useful in many
other settings. In fact, one might suppose that clients often involve
lawyers for the very reason that lawyers are perceived to be more
trustworthy than the clients themselves.
Another aspect of the controversy over negotiating standards
is abuse of power. Rules of procedure and, to some extent, rules of
evidence help prevent one lawyer in a court controversy from tak-
ing unreasonable advantage of the other lawyer's vulnerability. For
example, both lawyers are entitled to precise pleadings and discov-
ery regardless of how experienced or inexperienced one lawyer
might be. Rules of evidence, properly applied, prevent one lawyer
from bullying the other despite one lawyer's dominant personal
style. But there are no rules of procedure or rules of evidence gov-
erning the negotiating process, only ill defined rules of ethics. Con-
sequently, the tactic of bullying and abuse of position has free
reign in negotiation.
Analyzing the legitimacy of abuse of power during negotiation
makes one even more ill at ease than analyzing lack of trustworthi-
ness during negotiation. Prevarication is a situationally acceptable
folkway (e.g., "everything is fine, Mother"), and we can move read-
ily from that posture to the idea that lack of trustworthiness is
normal during negotiation. Abuse of power, on the other hand, is
not socially acceptable and brings forth at least mild contempt
whenever and wherever encountered. Accordingly, a novice to the
subject of standards for negotiating might postulate that rules of
negotiating are more tolerant of prevarication than they are of
abuse of power. As we shall see later, that is not the case.
II. LET'S DANCE! CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATING ETHICS
To most practitioners it appears that anything sanctioned by the rules of the
game is appropriate. From this point of view, negotiations are merely, as the
social scientists have viewed it, a form of game; observance of the expected
rules, not professional ethics, is the guiding precept. But gamesmanship is
not ethics.3
gation to Be Trustworthy When Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REv. 181, 183
(1981).
3. Rubin, supra note 1, at 586.
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As practiced by many attorneys, deception is the spirit of ne-
gotiation. Negotiating lawyers misstate facts, willfully mislead by
manipulating known facts, or fail to correct an opponent's igno-
rance or misconception about matters central to the negotiation.
These tactics vary in sophistication from merely putting on a false
face to expressly lying about the extent of settlement authority. In
a broad sense, justifications exist for this less than honest standard
for negotiating. A lawyer's devotion to the client's interest is so
compelling that some lawyers feel justified, if not compelled, to
employ some deception when negotiating.4 This viewpoint assumes
that clients have a right to a lawyer who engages in deception. Un-
fortunately, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and its
modern cousin, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, do not
adequately address whether or not clients have a right to a decep-
tive lawyer.5
Another justification for less than honest and straight-forward
negotiating is the belief that a convention exists among lawyers to
mislead during negotiations. This viewpoint, when carried to its
logical conclusion, means that lawyers expect to negotiate with one
another much like the proverbial used car salesperson. What a cu-
rious postulate for a learned and "high-toned" profession to adopt.
One wonders how even the most experienced laywer in a negotia-
tion can tell the difference between an honest party upon whom he
can rely, and a deceitful party, upon whom he should not rely.
A final justification for less than honest and straight-forward
negotiating is that deceit is inherent to negotiation. Are misrepre-
sentations essential to negotiations? Certainly non-lawyer negotia-
tors engage in deception from time to time. Should we expect
something else from lawyers?6 Consider the negotiationg standards
of two holy men, one a willing buyer and the other a willing seller.
If their personal commitments to holiness prevented them from
making the slightest misrepresentation or from engaging in any
abuse of their bargaining positions, how would the ultimate out-
come of their negotiations differ from the outcome achieved by two
lawyer negotiators? If deceit truly is inherent to negotiation, the
outcome achieved by the holy men could not be defined as the
4. See generally id.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 7-27.
6. For presentations of a new frame of reference about expectations of the legal pro-
fession that renounce notions of deceit and avarice as appropriate, see R. FISHER & W. URY,
GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATIONG AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981) and T. SHAFFER, ON
BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER. LAW FOR THE INNOCENT (1981).
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product of a negotiation. But if the results achieved by their meth-
ods are somehow better or fairer than the result achieved by law-
yers, then perhaps the legal definition of negotiation should be
changed.
None of these rationalizations for deceptive negotiating is fully
satisfactory. As a consequence, each prevaricating negotiator relies
upon one or some combination of them. Each negotiator feels more
or less justified to deceive or to abuse power when negotiating, de-
pending upon how well the chosen rationalizations satisfy the
moral imperative of that particular negotiator. The result might be
thought of as a disco dance floor full of negotiators, some more
adroit than others, some more at ease with the music than others,
and each very definitely free to "do his own thing." Obviously,
what is missing is a specific and reasonably thorough set of stan-
dards for negotiating.
III. A REVIEW OF THE CONVENTIONAL RULES
The existing standards for negotiating include statements in
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility; statements in the
new Model Rules of Professional Conduct; a few cases based
largely on principles of contract law, not principles of ethics; and a
few statutes criminalizing laywer deceit. A review of these sources
highlights the areas that most need fresh thinking and action.
According to DR 7-101(A) in the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (the "Model Code") a lawyer shall not intentionally
fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client. From that postulate
one can make convincing arguments about a lawyer's duty to get
the "best" deal - not the "fairest" deal. DR 7-102, however, casts
a heavy shadow on such a broad interpretation of DR 7-101. DR 7-
102, entitled "Representing a Client Within The Bounds of The
Law," provides, inter alia:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other
action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such
action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing
law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported
by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law.




(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.
(7) Counsel or assist his clients in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal
or fraudulent.7
Furthermore, to these limiting provisions of DR 7-102(A) we can
add the broader prohibition of DR 1-102(A)-which deals with
lawyer misconduct-that states a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."8
Surprisingly, these rules, although not expressly aimed at ne-
gotiating per se, express a reasonably comprehensive frame of ref-
erence for honest negotiation. A lawyer is told to seek the lawful
objectives of his client. Then a lawyer is told that attempting to
accomplish that purpose should not involve the following: (1) as-
serting a position merely to harass or maliciously injure another;'
(2) knowingly advancing a claim unwarranted under existing law10
(note that no mention is made about claims unwarranted by the
facts); or (3) assisting the client in conduct that the lawyer knows
is fraudulent."' Finally, the lawyer is told twice that he is not to
make false statements of law or fact, including engaging in deceit. 2
These provisions could eliminate deceitful negotiation or nego-
tiation by the abuse of power; yet we know that deceit and abuse
of power are common negotiating ploys. The debate presently cen-
ters on the degree to which deceit and abuse are to be tolerated,
not on whether or not they should be a part of negotiating. There
can be several explanations for what seems to be a general disinter-
est on the part of lawyers in adopting these requirements of the
Model Code into negotiating practice. The following three explana-
tions come to mind: (1) lawyers can find direct conflict between
express or implicit instructions from their clients and those disci-
plinary rules; (2) the confidentiality of a lawyer's knowledge about
his client may conflict with the requirement of the rules; and (3)
the courts do not support the aforementioned rules. Any or all of
these three reasons might form a reasonable argument for con-
7. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, DR 7-102 (1979).
8. Id. DR 1-102(A).
9. Id. DR 7-102(A)(1).
10. Id. DR 7-102(A)(2).
11. Id. DR 7-102(A)(7).
12. Id. DR 7-102(A)(5), DR 1-102 (A)(4).
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ducting deceitful negotiations, despite such statements as: "A law-
yer shall not ... engage in ... deceit."'13
Let us examine the first hypothesis: that clients instruct law-
yers explicitly or implicitly to negotiate deceitfully. Too much pro-
fessional diffidence exists between clients and lawyers to expect
that propositon to be true, at least in a majority of cases. For the
most part clients come to lawyers for lawful relief and for honora-
ble service, not for fraudulent relief and for deceitful service. Fur-
thermore, our present disciplinary rules give a lawyer ample oppor-
tunity to guide a client away from thoughts of deceitful tactics.
The Model Code's EC 7-8 provides:
In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a
lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally
just as well as legally permissible. He may emphasize the possibility of harsh
consequences that might result from assertion of legally permissible positions.
The new Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Model
Rules") are more specific with two provisions on point. Rule 2.1
provides: "In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law
but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and po-
litical factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation. ' 14 The
Comment [1] to Rule 1.3 states:
A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. However, a lawyer is
not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. A
lawyer has professional discretion in determining the means by which a mat-
ter should be pursued.'5
Lawyers cannot hide behind fidelity to client to rationalize deceit-
ful negotiation. Not only is it unrealistic to believe that many cli-
ents actually instruct lawyers to behave in a deceitful manner, a
lawyer's code of ethics encourages him to guide the client away
from any such thoughts.
The second hypothesis to justify ignoring those provisions in
the DRs that require forthrightness in negotiation is that a lawyer
is prohibited from revealing confidential information, thus making
forthright negotiation virtually impossible. DR 4-101(B)(1) does
prohibit a lawyer from revealing his client's "confidences" or "se-
cret,"' 6 and Model Rule 1.6 appears to go even further by prohibit-
13. Id. DR 1-102(A)(4).
14. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1983).
15. Id. Rule 1.3 Comment [1].
16. "[A] lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) Reveal a confidence or a secret of his client."
MODEL CODE, DR 4-101(B)(1).
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ing a lawyer from revealing information "relating to representation
of a client.'1 7 The Model Code's EC 4-2, however, sets out a kind
of rule of reason for revealing confidences, part of which allows a
lawyer to reveal that which the client has not expressly forbidden
him from revealing if such information is necessary to the lawyer's
professional employment - such as conducting negotiations.'5
Furthermore, if a client refused a lawyer's request to reveal some
relevant confidential fact that the lawyer's failure to reveal likely
would amount to deceit, DR 1-102(A)(4)'s prohibition of engaging
in deceit would require a lawyer faced with the recalcitrant client
to withdraw.'9
Under the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer
with a client who is recalcitrant about revealing information during
a negotiation is in a dilemma. Rule 4.1 states:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by rule 1.6.20
Within the context of negotiating, Rule 4.1 leads one to sev-
eral postulates. First, a lawyer cannot disclose a confidence, even
though material to a negotiation, if the client instructs the lawyer
not to reveal it, unless failure to reveal would result in the client's
committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to re-
sult in imminent death or substantial bodily harm - a very un-
likely scenario.' Second, if not limited by a client's instructions, a
lawyer must reveal a fact material to the negotiation if necessary
to avoid a fraud by the client.22 The older Model Code did not
17. "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless
a client consents after consultation .... ." MODEL RULES, RULE 1.6
18. EC 4-2 provides inter alia: "The obligation to protect confidences and secrets obvi-
ously does not preclude a lawyer from revealing information when ... necessary to perform
his professional employment.. . ." MODEL CODE, EC 4-2.
19. "A lawyer representing a client.., shall withdraw from employment. . if [hie
knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a Discipli-
nary Rule." Id. DR 2-110(B).
20. MODEL RULES, Rule 4.1.
21. Note that Rule 4.1(b) is modified by Rule 1.6, which states, inter alia:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless
the client consents .... (b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent the client from committing a crimi-
nal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm. MODEL RULEs, Rule 1.6.
22. "In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to
disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting...
[Vol. 39:13871394
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define "fraud." 23 The newer Model Rules define "fraud" as con-
duct having a purpose to deceive, not mere failure to apprise an-
other of relevant information.24 Because a client with a purpose to
deceive (i.e. fraud) invariably will expressly forbid the lawyer to
reveal material facts, this second postulate is of little practical
value.25 Third, a lawyer cannot make a false statement of material
fact or law.26 This particular postulate should come as no surprise.
After all, a profession aspiring to be high-toned would not tolerate
its members making false statements, a fortiori materially false
statements. Consequently, confidentiality between lawyer and cli-
ent is not a justification for a lawyer declaratively lying about a
material fact or law during a negotiation. Finally, a brief caveat
might be added. Deceitful or not, lies about price, value, and some
other matters are practically sacrosanct to conventional negotia-
tion. If lawyers were forbidden from engaging in these lies, they
would be at a tremendous disadvantage when negotiating with any
nonlawyer. Consequently, lawyers are permitted to lie about these
matters during negotiation. In summary, we can say that Rule 4.1
does little to guide a lawyer during negotiation when the lawyer's
concern is how much, if any, confidential client information can be
revealed. In fact, Rule 4.1 says more about what deceit is permit-
ted in the name of confidentiality than it says about what deceit is
not permitted.
IV. Do THE COURTS SUPPORT THE APPROACH OF THE DR's?
Few cases in which the precise question is the effect of deceit-
ful negotiation by an attorney have reached appellate courts. Mc-
Veigh v. McGuerren28 presented an instance in which a lawyer
a fraudulent act by a client .... " Id. Rule 4.1.
23. A discussion of use of the word "fraud" in DR 7-102(B)(1) can be found in MARU,
ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 324-25 (1979).
24. MODEL RULES, Terminology, 1 4.
25. Id. Rule 4.1 Comment [3].
26. Id. Rule 4.1(a). Rule 4.1(a) is substantially similar to DR 7-102(A)(5), except that
Rule 4.1(a) refers to "material" fact whereas DR 7-102(A)(5) refers merely to "fact."
27. Rule 4.1(a) states: "In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not know-
ingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person." Obviously, matters
like price and value are material facts in any negotiation. Nevertheless, the authors of the
Code have announced by fiat that price and value are not "facts." Comment [2] to Rule 4.1
states, inter alia: "Under generally accepted conventions of negotiation, certain types of
statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or
value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable
settlement of a claim are in this category. . . ... Id. Rule 4.1 comment 2.
28. 117 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 573 (1941).
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made a material misrepresentation of fact to an opponent during a
negotiation. The court held that the resulting compromise settle-
ment could be set aside and that the offended party could recover
damages against the deceitful attorney. The attorney in McVeigh
was seeking to reduce a large claim for past due child support
when he stated that his client was without significant funds. In
fact the client had inherited a large sum of money. In a criminal
case, a lawyer was disciplined for entering into plea negotiations
with the state while knowing that her client-defendant willfully
had misled the state into thinking that the client-defendant was
the client-defendant's brother.29
A more interesting example of judicial attitudes toward deceit-
ful negotiating by an attorneyt emerges in Kath v. Western Me-
dia.30 In Kath an attorney first rejected a $12,000 offer made dur-
ing negotiations, but after learning privately that a key witness
had lied during his deposition, the attorney reopened negotiations
and accepted the $12,000 offer without revealing this newly discov-
ered information. Careful note should be made of the strong argu-
ment that the attorney would be revealing confidential information
under Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules if he revealed the witness' mis-
representation. The court held that the attorney had a duty to re-
veal this material information to the other side and vacated the
settlement.
Court opinions requiring fairness from attorneys during the
negotiation process may indicate a similar expectation by the legis-
latures in numerous states that have passed statutes criminalizing
deceitful conduct by lawyers. For example, a New York statute"1
makes it a misdemeanor for an attorney to engage in "any deceit"
with intent to deceive a court or any party. In a somewhat more
limited fashion, Minnesota makes it a misdemeanor for a lawyer to
deceive a court or a party to a judicial proceeding. 2 Depending
upon one's viewpoint, it may seem curious that the annotations to
those statutes do not reveal any prosecutions. Nevertheless, we can
feel secure in saying that courts and the legislatures do support the
notion of honest negotiation by attorneys, perhaps even beyond
the requirements of the lawyers' own professional code of ethics.
29. In re Discipline of Casby, 355 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1984).
30. 684 P.2d 98 (Wyo. 1984).
31. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 487 (McKinney 1983). See also IND. CODE § 34-1-60-9 (1973).
32. MINN. STAT. § 481.07 (1971).
[Vol. 39:13871396
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V. THE IMPACT OF FAIRNESS ON LOYALTY TO THE CLIENT
While there may be a few cases where the lawyer's honesty and fairness deny
the client the benefit of a bargain, such losses are a small sacrifice for pre-
serving the honor and integrity of the profession.
3 3
Among the many objections to the movement toward fairness
as a standard for negotiating between lawyers, the objection that a
fairness standard may detract from a lawyer's paramount obliga-
tion to the client is the most worthy of serious and concerned
study. Indeed, if a single principle unifies the legal profession, it is
paramount loyalty to the client's cause. Lord Brougham summa-
rized the issue as only an English barrister could in his renowned
defense of the Queen in 1820.
To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs
to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty;
and, in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others.
3 4
Eloquence aside, Lord Brougham is quite simply wrong. To
postulate that the value of loyalty to client is higher than all other
values not only does not comport with reality; it does not conform
with the requirements of professional ethics.3 5 Although loyalty to
client is sometimes put forward by lawyers as an absolute value, a
noticeable shift has occurred over the years in the approach taken
by codified professional ethics. The original Canons of Professional
Ethics stated in Canon 15:
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from
him, save by the rules of law, legally applied .3
Later, when the ABA adopted the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, the corresponding idea was located in DR 7-101(A)(3),
which states: "A lawyer shall not intentionally ...prejudice or
33. Burke, Truth in Lawyering: An Essay on Lying and Deceit in the Practice of
Law, 38 ARK. L. REV. 1, 12 (1984).
34. D. MELLINKOFF, LAWYERS AND THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE 511 (1976) (quoting 2 TRIAL
OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (1821)).
35. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, DR 2-109(A)(1). ("A lawyer shall not accept employment
on behalf of a person if he knows or if it is obvious that such person wishes to ... conduct a
defense, or assert a position in litigation, or otherwise have steps taken for him, merely for
the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person..") MODEL RULES, Rule 4.4 ("In
representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other
than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence
that violate the legal rights of such a person.").
36. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1908).
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damage his client during the course of the professional relation-
ship. . . . ". Currently, under the new Model Rules, Rule 1.3 sim-
ply states: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client." 8 Apparently, the excessively
ambitious verbiage in the original canon has given way over the
years as the obligation of the legal profession to the public good
has increased.
Client loyalty and its corollary obligations of promptness,
competency, and confidentialtiy exist because we want every client
to have their legal rights fully implemented. We believe as a nation
that full implementation is not possible in most instances unless
lawyers are available, loyal, prompt, competent, and tight-lipped.
Today, while no one quarrels with any of those ideas, some lawyers
talk of going beyond those ideas to the next level of abstraction:
that no client has a right (legal or otherwise) to use lawyers to do
injustice. At this second level of abstraction a lawyer's loyalty obli-
gation is tempered somewhat, as are the corollary obligations of
promptness, competency, and confidentiality. The curious anomaly
is that while lawyers continue to use loyalty to client as a stalking
horse for maintaining the status quo in negotiating ethics, they
also create specific exceptions to client loyalty when mandated by
this second level of abstraction. Examples in the Model Rules
abound: (1) A lawyer shall not counsel or assist a client in fraud or
a criminal act;89 (2) a lawyer may reveal confidences to prevent a
client from committing a crime likely to result in substantial bod-
ily harm;40 (3) a lawyer may reveal confidences to establish a claim
or to assert a defense in a controversy between lawyer and client;41
(4) a lawyer may withdraw if a client insists upon pursuing an ob-
jective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;42 (5) in
rendering advice a lawyer may take into account moral factors;4 3
(6) a lawyer may disclose matters as required in connection with a
report of an evaluation to the public;44 (7) a lawyer shall be candid
with a tribunal, including revealing law adverse to his client, and if
a proceding is ex parte, a lawyer must reveal facts adverse to his
37. MODEL CODE, DR 7-101(A)(3).
38. MODEL RULES, Rule 1.3(d).
39. Id.
40. Id. Rule 1.6(b)(1).
41. Id. Rule 1.6(b)(2).
42. Id. Rule 1.6(b)(3).
43. Id. Rule 2.1.
44. Id. Rule 2.3(b).
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client;4 5 (8) a lawyer shall not violate the legal rights of third per-
sons to obtain evidence;"' (9) a lawyer may engage in public inter-
est activity that may adversely affect the private interests of a cli-
ent;47 (10) a lawyer may not engage in conduct prejudicial to
administration of justice. 8 In each of these instances the Model
Rules permit, and in many instances require, a lawyer to do some-
thing that benefits the public good to the likely detriment of the
client. Why, then, is the notion that negotiation should achieve a
fair result through forthrightness a repugnant notion to so many
lawyers?
VI. Is NORMALIZING A STANDARD OF FAIRNESS REALISTIC?
We have noted that categorical rules about negotiation are al-
ways controversial and frequently ignored. We have noted that
some form of deceit, at least in the broadest sense of the word, is
inherent in all negotiations and that a lawyer with an obligation to
obtain the best result for a client cannot be expected, realistically,
to negotiate outside the context of everyday convention. We have
explored the rationalization that part of a lawyer's professional so-
cialization is realizing the extent to which deceit and abuse of
power may be employed during negotiations. Finally, we have ex-
plored the effect of several professional norms, such as confidenti-
ality, on the prospects for candor and fairness in a negotiation be-
tween attorneys. Taken together, all of these factors seem to doom
any hope of interposing fairness as a new, enforceable standard for
the negotiating process. Nevertheless, some lawyers speculate and
dream about a new approach to negotiation. Perhaps no better ex-
ample of this plea for high-toned morality can be found than in the
words of Judge Rubin:
Client avarice and hostility neither control the lawyer's conscience nor mea-
sure his ethics. Surely if its practitioners are principled, a profession that
dominates the legal process in our law-oriented society would not expect too
much if it required its members to adhere to two simple principles when they
negotiate as professionals: Negotiate honestly and in good faith; and do not
take unfair advantage of another- regardless of his relative expertise or
sophistication.49
Posed against Rubin and those of like mind is another group
45. Id. Rule 3.3(a)(3), (d).
46. Id. Rule 4.4.
47. Id. Rule 6.4.
48. Id. Rule 8.4(d).
49. Rubin, supra note 3, at 593.
1986] 1399
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
of lawyers with the view that lawyer negotiators must have explicit
and detailed commandments if they are to break free from the
conventional, professional norms that now seem to compel deceit-
ful negotiating practices. In the words of Professor White:
Pious and generalized assertions that the negotiator must be "honest" or that
the lawyer must use "candor" are not helpful. They are at too high a level of
generality, and they fail to appreciate the fact that truth and truthful behav-
ior at one time in one set of circumstances with one set of negotiators may be
untruthful in another circumstance with other negotiators."
To admit that changing current standards of negotiating prac-
tice among lawyers is difficult is not to admit that it is impossible.
Indeed, some indicators are encouraging, although they may be
dim. First, the recent appearance of law school courses on negotia-
tion and the publication of some useful teaching materials for
those courses are signs that future lawyers may be more willing to
accept fairness as a standard in negotiating.5' As a corollary to the
movement in law schools, the law reviews are giving more attention
to the issue of the ethics of negotiating.52 Furthermore, admitting
that conventions about negotiation are learned during the process
of socialization into the profession is admitting that lawyers are
taught norms for negotiating. Thus, arguments that lawyers expect
deceit from another lawyer need not be interpreted as arguments
in favor of deceit; rather they can be interpreted as arguments for
changing what lawyers are taught to expect.
Many practicing lawyers now openly concede, at least at the
intellectual level, the need to bring some sort of uplifting modifica-
tions to the practice of negotiating. Proof of this view can be found
in the legislative history of Rule 4.2 of the new Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. The 1980 Discussion Draft of Rule 4.2(a)
stated: "In conducting negotiations a lawyer shall be fair in dealing
with other participants. 5 3 Without more in the way of text or ex-
planation, adoption of that rule, relying as it did on the nebulous
concept of "fair" as the key descriptive phrase, probably would
have done more harm than good. As proposed the rule could have
50. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 926, 929, quoted in Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation,
17 U. RiCH. L. REv. 99, 101-02 (1982).
51. Some of the better known teaching materials for law school courses in negotiation
are: H. EDWARDS & J. WHiTE, THE LAWYER As A NEGOTIATOR (1977); G. BELLOW &
B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS (1978); and G. WILLIAMs, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND
SETrLEMENT (1983).
52. See Guernsey, supra note 50.
53. MODEL RULES, Rule 4.2 (Discussion Draft 1980).
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become a vehicle for lawyers with one set of values to characterize
other, honest lawyers with different values as "unfair" and in vio-
lation of the rule.
As if anticipating such unintended and undesirable results, the
drafters of the proposed rule added an explanation of fairness
within the context of negotiation. Their approach is conservative.
One part of the explanation of "fairness" stated:
Fairness in negotiation implies that representations by or in behalf of one
party to the other party be truthful. This requirement is reflected in contract
law, particularly the rules relating to fraud and mistake. A lawyer involved in
negotiations has an obligation to assure as far as practicable that the negotia-
tions conform to the law's requirements in this regard.5 '
In reality, that commentary does little more than ask lawyers to
follow existing case precedents concerning truth, concealment,
fraud, and mistake.55
For the benefit of lawyers who might be especially concerned
about the impact of fairness on their attorney-client confidences,
the drafters of the proposed Comment added this statement:
A lawyer could properly be regarded as having a professional responsibility to
see that negotiations under his or her auspices are informed on all sides.
However, to make a lawyer responsible for an opposing party's information
about the matter in negotiation exposes the lawyer to charges of misfeasance
that can be easily contrived, and exposes the transaction to additional risk of
being legally avoided on the ground of mistake.56
Whether intentional or not, that statement can be interpreted as
an innovative way to avoid the controversy, discussed earlier,
about the tensions surrounding a lawyer's client-related duty to
keep confidences and a lawyer's society-related duty to achieve fair
results. 57 Instead of confronting the issue of when a lawyer should
reveal a client confidence because it promotes fairness in negotia-
tions, the drafters deftly shifted the focus from fairness to allega-
tions of lawyer misfeasance if fair disclosure becomes the norm.
One might speculate whether a rationale for lack of candor based
on self-interested protection from accusations of misfeasance is
more palatable than the conventional rationale based on a lawyer's
duty to his client.
If lawyers adopted fairness as an explicit standard as pro-
posed, questions would be raised about the inherently deceitful as-
pects of negotiation, such as overstating of price or value. The
54. MODEL RULEs, Rule 4.2 Comment (Discussion Draft 1980).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32.
56. MODEL RuLEs, Rule 4.2 Comment (Discussion Draft 1980).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 33-48.
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drafters of the proposed rule dealt with that issue quite candidly.
The precise contours of the legal duties concerning disclosure, representation,
puffery, overreaching, and other aspects of honesty in negotiations cannot be
concisely stated. They have changed over time and vary according to circum-
stances. They also can vary according to the party's familiarity with transac-
tions of the kind involved. Thus, the modern law of commercial transactions
places duties of disclosure on sellers that go well beyond the classic rule of
caveat emptor, and modern securities transactions often must conform to
elaborate disclosure rules. It is a lawyer's responsibility to see that negotia-
tions conducted by the lawyer conform to applicable legal standards,
whatever they may be.5 8
As mentioned previously, because the Model Rules drafters
proposed fairness as a standard, a group of lawyers in fact do join
with Judge Rubin's call for honest and candid negotiating practice.
Admittedly, the wording of proposed Rule 4.1 left room for legiti-
mate concern about interpretation. Instead of embracing the idea
of a new high-toned morality for negotiating practice and attempt-
ing to lessen the vagueness of the proposed standard, however, the
drafters voted for an entirely different version of Rule 4.1-one
that totally ignores fairness. As adopted Rule 4.1 states:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a
false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose
a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assist-
ing a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by
Rule 1.6.11
That lawyers should not deceive, should not mislead, or should
not overreach is too much a part of the common morality to be
ignored much longer. Normative negotiating conduct between law-
yers cannot survive as a set of values distinct from values held by
society at large. Fairness and honesty as concepts are too ingrained
in the American mentality to be disregarded even by the legal pro-
fession. For now, each lawyer must decide on an individual basis,
and perhaps even on a negotiation by negotiation basis, whether he
will adopt a high-toned moral approach or a car salesman approach
to negotiations, but one wonders how long the absence of specific
standards for honesty and candor in negotiation will be tolerated.
58. MODEL RULES, Rule 4.2 Comment (Discussion Draft 1980).
59. MODEL RULES, Rule 4.1.
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VI. A CONCLUDING PROPOSAL FOR A FAIRNESS STANDARD
As a starting point the following proposed rule is offered:
Obligation of Fairness and Candor in Negotiation
When serving as an advocate in court a lawyer must work to achieve the most
favorable outcome for his client consistent with the law and the admissible
evidence. However, when serving as a negotiator lawyers should strive for a
result that is objectively fair. Principled negotiation between lawyers on be-
half of clients should be a cooperative process, not an adversarial process.
Consequently, whenever two or more lawyers are negotiating on behalf of cli-
ents, each lawyer owes the other an obligation of total candor and total coop-
eration to the extent required to insure that the result is fair.
Like other explicit statements this rule is value laden and provoca-
tive. Perhaps the best single answer to criticism of the proposal is
to point out that the rule is not designed for specific situations;
instead, the rule points toward an ethos of high-toned morality
among negotiating lawyers. Will a rhetorical rule be taken seri-
ously? We know that the courts have been consistent in insisting
upon a standard that reflects fairness and candor. We know that
clients do not have the right to expect lawyers to serve as a tool for
deceit or for vengeance. From the client's perspective, a primary
motivation for seeking a lawyer's help should be the expectation of
a fair negotiation. Only in a situation when one party is repre-
sented and the other party is not does the represented client have
the right to expect a lawyer to be governed by the less high-toned
rules of the market place. The price of high-toned negotiation
among lawyers is some lessening of the confidentiality of communi-
cation between lawyer and client. Ultimately, some clients will re-
ceive less from a settlement negotiated under the standard of fair-
ness than they would have received before the change to the
fairness standard. These losses, however, both in confidentiality of
information and in settlement result, are losses that come about
because lawyers are fairer negotiators. A loss paid for in fairness
cannot be described properly as a loss.
Already the legal profession provides in DR 1-102(A)(4) that a
lawyer should not engage in "deceit." Thus, it is not so much rules
that must change as it is the convention of practice that must
change. The process of debating a rule similar to that suggested by
this Essay might serve to make an already incipient movement for
change into a more vital force.
Of course, fair negotiation practices require more effort from
the legal profession. But lawyers in negotiating situations have an
adequate idea of what is fair, and many negotiators strive to reach
fair results now. All that the proposed rule suggests is that a law-
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yer not do that which his conscience and his experience tell him is
unfair. The time for change has come.
